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ARISTOTLE’S PLURALISTIC REALISM
1. Introduction
Realism about natural kinds goes back at least as far as Plato’s
Phaedrus, which famously employs the metaphor of a butcher to describe
the method of collection and division (265D–E).1 Collection (sunagôgê)
consists in “seeing together the many scattered things and drawing them
into a single form,” while division (diaresis) involves cutting up each
thing “along its natural joints” (kat’ arthra êi pephuken). In doing so,
Socrates tells the young Phaedrus, one must be careful not to break any
part into pieces “like a bad butcher might do.” It is hard not to read
Socrates’s metaphor as expressing a commitment to the reality of natural
kinds. The natural world contains “parts” (cf. Statesman 262AB) that are
individuated on the basis of real, mind-independent boundaries (the
“joints”). Being a bad butcher consists in dividing across those boundaries.
In contrast to this, the nominalist claims that nature contains no natural joints;
there is simply a continuity of similarities that blend into one another.2
Therefore, any divisions we make are ultimately arbitrary and self-
serving. For the nominalist, even our best scientific classifications will be
anthropocentric insofar as they reflect properties that we as humans find
interesting. Plato was aware of these anthropocentric concerns. At
Statesman 236D, the Eleatic Stranger criticizes Young Socrates’s division
of animals into humans and nonhumans by saying that if cranes could
speak they would balk at this and insist that the world comes divided into
cranes and noncranes. Presumably the theory of Forms is supposed to
avoid this problem by grounding division in objective reality. Although
biologists no longer take seriously the theory of Forms, they are not very
impressed by nominalism either, at least when it comes to the existence of
species.3 Species such as Pandion haliaetus and Vampyroteuthis infernalis
are real groups individuated on the basis of objective biological properties
that do not depend on our recognizing them as such.4
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While there are various competing theories of natural kinds on the
market, the following characterization captures the main idea behind
natural kinds.5 First, natural kinds are groups of things sharing certain
objective properties in common, in virtue of which they form a single
kind. What makes a kind natural as opposed to conventional is a difficult
issue. One way of drawing the distinction is to say that the former share
objective similarities in common while the latter depend mainly on human
interests. For this reason gold constitutes a natural kind while all the
objects in my garage do not. Second, natural kinds have essences.
Typically an essence is understood to be a membership-determining
property that is both necessary and sufficient for belonging to a kind. On
some more robust theories (such as Aristotle’s), the essence also plays a
causal role in determining other properties of the kind. For example,
having the atomic number 79 not only makes something a member of the
kind gold but is also causally responsible for the possession of other char-
acteristic properties, including a certain colour and malleability. Elliot
Sober (1980, 354) puts the point this way: “The key idea, I think, is that
the membership condition must be explanatory. The essentialist hypothe-
sizes that there exists some characteristic unique to and shared by all
members of Homo sapiens which explains why they are the way they are.
A species essence will be a causal mechanism which works on each
member of the species, making it the kind of thing that it is.”
Not all theories of natural kinds agree on how to characterize the es-
sentialism involved. One might take kinds to be defined by essential
properties without thinking of those properties as being causally respon-
sible for other properties associated with the kind. Nor do all essentialist
theories accept the idea that kinds are defined by properties that are both
necessary and sufficient for membership. So-called cluster kind theories,
for example, take certain properties to be diagnostic but deny that they are
“essential” in the sense that nothing can lack them and still be a member
of the kind. On this account, natural kinds are defined by a cluster of
stable features, none of which are necessary and only a subset of which
are sufficient for membership in the kind.6
While all realists about natural kinds accept Plato’s metaphor about
cutting nature at the joints, they differ in terms of how they understand the
metaphor.7 Monistic realism is the view that there is only one true set of
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(nonoverlapping) kinds for any given scientific domain and that discover-
ing those kinds will yield a single, unified system of natural
classifications. By contrast, pluralistic realism sees a given domain as a
multidimensional space that can be divided along multiple axes.8 This
multidimensional complexity is not something that can be captured by a
single, universal classification. Instead, there are many equally legitimate
ways of dividing the objects in that domain into natural kinds, which may
cross-classify one another in indefinitely complex ways. For example, the
living world might be divided along its ‘trophic joints’ into one set of
kinds (coprophagous, necrophagous, phytophagous, saprophytic, etc.), or
along its ‘parasitic joints’ into another set of kinds (endoparasites, ec-
toparasites, parasitoids, etc.), or along its ‘phyletic joints’ into
phylogenetic kinds (monophyletic, paraphyletic, polyphyletic).9
Assuming that each of these divisions picks out a set of real kinds, the
pluralist will argue that no one set of kinds should be privileged over
another.
In this paper I argue that Aristotle is a pluralist when it came to the
study of biological diversity: he denies that there is only one true set of bi-
ological kinds and that a natural classification will divide those kinds into
a single set of exhaustive and nonoverlapping categories.10 Instead, there
are many equally legitimate ways of classifying living things, though no
single way of classifying them is privileged over the other. Despite this
pluralistic approach to classification, Aristotle remains committed to
realism and thus shares an affinity with traditional scientific realists who
hold that there are objective kinds in nature (such as chemical kinds) de-
lineated by real, mind-independent boundaries.11 Thus, like Plato,
Aristotle thinks the natural world comes divided up into kinds that are
somehow “out there” waiting to be discovered and that our best scientific
classifications will be those that successfully map out these natural
divisions. This interpretation places Aristotle squarely in the camp of plu-
ralistic realism.12
This reading is similar to that of Pellegrin (1982). On Pellegrin’s
reading, Aristotle treats classification as a pragmatic exercise in which the
division of animals into kinds is “developed for the occasion, adapting
their extension and rigor to the needs of the exposition in progress” (115).
My reading differs from this in that I take Aristotle also to be a realist
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about biological kinds rather than being merely pragmatic about them.
That is, despite his pluralistic approach to classification, Aristotle still
believed there is a certain naturalness to the various biological groupings
(hence the realism). For at the core of each cross-cutting kind lies a real
essence that corresponds to an aitia or cause. And according to APo. II 2,
we are justified in claiming that some kind exists once we have discovered
that there is a cause that is responsible for the fact that a certain cluster of
attributes regularly co-vary. So Aristotle’s practice of classification in the
biological works is not subjective but identifies real kinds, despite the fact
that which kinds are identified is governed largely by the explanatory
goals of the classifier. For “explanation” in Aristotle is limited to
phenomena that exhibit a determinate causal structure.
My defense of this reading is concentrated in sections §2 and §3.
Section §2 establishes the pluralist aspect of this interpretation by
showing how Aristotle’s biology employs several overlapping divisions
without privileging one set of divisions over another. Section §3 attempts
to establish the realism by looking at Aristotle’s concept of “nature” and
the method he recommends for determining the existence of a natural
kind. According to this account a genuine kind is a group of individuals
sharing a “common nature,” which I take to be a nexus of correlations un-
derwritten by a set of causally basic features (the kind’s real essence). In
the final section (§4) I defend the claim that Aristotle’s biology should
remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it
combines pluralism and realism with a rank-free approach to classifica-
tion, which some philosophers see as the way forward in systematics. In
this context Grene (1974, 74) is surely right that the besieged biologists
and their philosophical defenders can learn something valuable by
reflecting on the one great philosopher who was also a great biologist.
2. Aristotle’s Pluralism
History of Animals I 6 identifies seven major biological kinds, which
Aristotle calls the megista genê or “Great Kinds:” birds, fish, cetaceans,
cephalopods, crustaceans, hard-shelled animals, and insects. Yet, this list
excludes many groups that Aristotle finds scientifically interesting enough
to investigate. For example, snakes are treated as a unified group sharing
a single common nature and containing specific forms that differ only by
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degree (e.g. History of Animals [HA] I 6, 490b24; II 14; III 1, 511a14–15).
As we shall see, these are marks of a natural kind. Other significant
groupings that Aristotle discusses in his biological writings include: live-
bearers and egg-layers; lung-possessors and gill-possessors;
claw-possessors (e.g. Parts of Animals [PA] IV 8, 684a34); horn-bearing
animals that lack incisors in both jaws, what we call “ruminants” (e.g. HA
III 1, 511a28–34; cf. Posterior Analytics [APo.] II 14, 98a13–19); bipeds,
quadrupeds, and footless animals; walkers, crawlers, leapers, and fliers
(e.g. Progression of Animals [IA] III; Generation of Animals [GA] I 1,
715a27–8); political (politika) animals, which include humans, bees, ants,
and cranes (HA I 1, 488a9); and my personal favourite, marine animals
that make use of crafty mechanisms (technika), which is a rather eclectic
group that includes the angler fish, various sea snakes, torpedo fish, fox
sharks, cuttlefish, and many more (HA VIII 37).13
According to the traditional view Aristotle assumes as uncontrover-
sial that there is a single correct way to classify animals into kinds, which
could be formulated in a single taxonomy (M. Tweedale, personal com-
munication). Yet, a complete survey of all the ways that Aristotle divides
up the living world reveals a tendency to classify things from a “multi-
plicity of viewpoints” (to borrow Pellegrin’s phrase), a practice which
often leads to multiple cross-classifications and overlapping kinds. And
yet, none of these ways of dividing up the biological landscape appears to
represent a privileged classification. Rather, each set of divisions proves
to be useful for a different causal investigation.
There are two main pieces of evidence that support this pluralistic
reading. The first are the several occurrences of cross-division, where a
division of animals into one set of kinds can be shown to cut across a
division into another set of kinds. And yet neither way of classifying
animals is said to be privileged over the other in any absolute sense. The
following example makes the point explicit.
Division 1. In GA II 1 Aristotle carves up the biological landscape
according to differences in mode of reproduction, which yields four
extensive kinds: live-bearers, egg-layers, larva-producers, and animals
that are spontaneously generated (732a26–733a1; cf. HA I 5, III 1). This
classification identifies the primary reproductive kinds that are the focus
of inquiry in the GA. From this perspective lizards and turtles are grouped
together with fish, birds, and snakes as egg-layers, while cetaceans are
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grouped with humans, elephants, and bats as live-bearers. Some of the
insects are then marked off as larva-producers, while others are said to be
spontaneously generated.
Division 2a. When Aristotle turns from reproduction to locomotion
in the IA (cf. HA I 1, 5), the very same animals are regrouped into a
different set of kinds. Here two main differentiae are used to classify
animals. In some places, Aristotle groups animals according to their type
of locomotion (IA III). The primary division here is into those that change
place with their whole body at the same time (e.g. jumpers) and those that
do so part-by-part (e.g. walkers).14 From this perspective lizards and
turtles are classified together with humans, elephants, and crabs as
walkers, cetaceans go with fish, water snakes, and crustaceans as
swimmers, while birds, bats, and insects make up the class of flyers.
Division 2b. In other places, Aristotle groups animals according to
the parts used for locomotion. From this perspective birds and humans are
classified together as bipeds, elephants, lions, lizards, and crocodiles as
quadrupeds, insects as polypods, while cetaceans, fish, and snakes are
classed as footless animals.
Division 3. Finally, in On Respiration Aristotle divides animals
according to their different ways of cooling themselves, giving us three
major refrigerative kinds: lung-possessors, gill-possessors, and
membrane-possessors.15 From this perspective, cetaceans get reclassified
with lizards, humans, and birds as lung-possessors, separating them off
from fish, cephalopods, and all the other marine animals that cool them-
selves by means of gills, leaving the insects as the only animals that cool
themselves by means of a vibrating membrane.
It is easy to see that these different ways of classifying animals
partition the biological world into kinds that cross-cut one another. For
example, Division 1 cuts across Division 3: some egg-layers are lung-pos-
sessors (e.g. birds, lizards, turtles, all the snakes except the viper), while
others are gill-possessors (e.g. the bony fish); likewise, some live-bearers
possess lungs (e.g. humans, cetaceans, horses, vipers), while others
possess gills (e.g. certain sharks and rays). Division 3 also cuts across
Divisions 2b: some lung-possessors are two-footed (humans and birds),
some four-footed (e.g. horses, oxen), some footless (e.g. whales and
dolphins), and at least one four-footed animal is a gill-possessor (e.g. the
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water newt: On Resp. 476a5).16 Aristotle himself draws our attention to
the fact that Division 1 overlaps with Division 2a:
In fact there is a good deal of overlapping among the kinds. For not all two-
footed animals are live-bearing (for birds are egg-laying) nor are they all
egg-laying (for humans are live-bearing), and not all four-footed animals are
egg-laying (for horses and oxen and a great deal of others are live-bearing)
nor are they all live-bearing (for lizards and crocodiles and many others are
egg-laying). Nor does the difference even lie in having-feet or not-having-
feet; for some footless animals are live-bearing (e.g. vipers and the
cartilaginous fish), while others are egg-laying (e.g. the kind consisting of
fish and the remainder of the snakes). And of the footed animals many are
egg-laying, many live-bearing (e.g. the four-footed animals already
mentioned). There are two-footed animals which are internally live-bearing
(e.g. humans) and footless ones as well (e.g. the whale and dolphin). So we
find no means of making a division here. (GA II 1, 732b15–27)
Finally, these different ways of classifying animals cut right across the so-
called Great Kinds of HA I 6. For example, Division 1 breaks up the fish:
bony fish are egg-layers, cartilaginous fish (with the exception of the
fishing frog) are live-bearers,17 while eels are spontaneously generated
(GA III 11). The division into larva-producers and spontaneously
generated animals also breaks up the insects, while Aristotle’s locomotive
kinds break up the cephalopods (some cephalopods are footed walkers,
while others are footless swimmers: PA IV 9, 685a14–15).
The other piece of evidence that suggests Aristotle was a pluralist
about classification comes from those animals that he describes as being
“epamphoterês.” Such animals are susceptible to multiple ways of classi-
fying them. Some of their features are best explained by classifying them
as one kind of animal, while others are explained by classifying them
under another (mutually exclusive) kind. The most spectacular example is
the Libyan ostrich. Incredibly, Aristotle claims that the Libyan ostrich is
both a bird and a live-bearing quadruped, which explains why this strange
animal possesses some of the features characteristic of the one kind and
some characteristic of the other kind:
In the same way, too, the Libyan ostrich [is ambiguous between two kinds].
On the one hand it has the character of birds, on the other hand that of the
live-bearing quadrupeds. For as a non-quadruped it has feathers but as a non-
bird it does not take to the air in flight and its feathers are not useful for flying
but are hair-like. Furthermore, as a quadruped it has upper eyelashes and is
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bald around the head and above the neck, so that it has hairier eyelashes. Yet
as a bird the lower body is feathered, and while as a bird it is two-footed, as
a quadruped it is hoofed. For it has, not toes, but hoofs. This is because its
size is not that of a bird but of a quadruped; for generally speaking, it is
necessary for birds to be as small as possible with respect to their size, since
it is not easy for a body of great mass to get off the ground. (PA IV 14,
697b13–28)
This example nicely illustrates how classification is tied to explanation.18
In order to explain why the ostrich’s lower body is covered in feathers and
why it is two-footed we need to classify it as a bird and then ask why those
features belong to all birds qua bird. For the cause of those features are to
be found at the level of that wider kind. But if we want to explain why the
ostrich is bald around the head and above the neck, has eyelashes, and
sports hoofs instead of split toes, we need to reclassify it as a quadruped
and look for the cause the level of that kind. The crucial point here is that,
for Aristotle, there is no single privileged way of classifying the ostrich,
either as a bird or as a quadruped, but rather how we classify it depends
on what features we are trying to explain. If we want to know why it has
some traits, we need to treat it as a bird; if we want to know why it has
other traits, we need to treat it as a quadruped. A commitment to the idea
that there is one and only one way to classify each animal would in-
evitably leave some of its traits unexplained.
My other example follows the same pattern. In HA II 8 Aristotle tells
us that apes, monkeys, and baboons can be classified both as bipeds and
as quadrupeds, since they share in the essential properties of both kinds
(502a16–24). This has explanatory significance. In PA IV 10 we are given
a causal explanation for why bipeds have haunches but lack a tail, while
quadrupeds have a tail but lack haunches. We are then told that being in-
termediate between these two kinds explains why the ape lacks both
features: “The ape, because it is intermediate between the two (epam-
photerês) with respect to its form, and because it is neither and both, has
neither a tail nor haunches: as a biped it lacks a tail, and as a quadruped
it lacks haunches” (689b32–4). Again, how we classify the ape depends
on what features we want to explain. If we want to know why it lacks a
tail, we need to treat it as a biped; if we want to know why it lacks
haunches, we need to treat it as a quadruped. There is no privileged way
of classifying the ape from an unqualified perspective.
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There is a worry here about substances having multiple essences and
thus being subject to multiple definitions, a position that Aristotle un-
doubtedly rejects. The worry can be reduced by noting that its force
derives from the thinking of an essence (the object of definition) as a
single property. In that case in order to be a bird and a quadruped the
ostrich would have to have two essences. But Aristotle thinks biological
kinds are characterized by essences composed of multiple attributes (PA I
3), some of which may be part of the essences of other kinds. His essen-
tialism only requires that the entire complex of attributes that makes up a
kind’s essence picks out that kind uniquely (APo. II 13, 96a24–b1). The
single essence of the Libyan ostrich will thus be defined by a single
complex of multiple attributes, some of which are characteristic of birds
and others characteristic of quadrupeds.19
ForAristotle, then, there is no single way of classifying animals from
some absolute, context-free perspective. Instead, how we classify animals
depends on the problem at hand: what wider kinds we subsume an animal
under depends on which of its features we are trying to explain. This is
hard to square with the idea that Aristotle was committed to a form of
monism when it came to classification. For Aristotle, there is no one way
of carving nature at the joints that will fit all animals into a single set of
mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and nonoverlapping kinds. Instead nature
contains many cross-cutting joints, and which joints we choose to cut
along depends in large part on the explanatory aims of the biologist. The
embryologist divides the animal kingdom according to the various modes
of reproduction, while the student of biomechanics divides by the
different ways of moving in space. And yet a division of animals into
swimmers, walkers, flyers, and crawlers will be of no use to the biologist
studying animal refrigeration. The set of problems that define her inquiry
require dividing the world into lung-possessors, gill-possessors, and
membrane-possessors.
There is one passage that appears to commit Aristotle to monism. In
PA I 2 Aristotle criticizes Platonic division for splitting apart certain kinds
that he claims ought to be kept together:
Further, one should avoid tearing each kind apart, e.g. putting some of the
birds in one division and some in the other, as the written [sc. Platonic]
divisions have done; there, some of the birds end up divided off with the
water-dwellers, some in another kind. . . . If, then, nothing alike in kind
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should be torn apart, division into two is worthless. For people who divide in
this way necessarily separate and tear apart; some of the many-footed things
are among the land-dwellers, while some are among the water-dwellers.
(642b10–19, Lennox trans.)
It is tempting to read this passage as treating certain kinds as privileged so
that any divisions that split them up must somehow be unnatural.
However, as we have just seen, this way of reading the text faces the
problem that Aristotle himself is willing to split up kinds when the
occasion calls for it.
One way to avoid this tension is to distinguish between one set of
“true kinds” (e.g. the Great Kinds) and downgrade all cross-cutting groups
to mere pragmatic groupings formed for expedience.20 While this might
work for a group like the “technika” (HAVIII 37), which is a motley crew
of animals from different Great Kinds, it will not work for groups like
egg-layers and lung-possessors, which (as we shall see) bear all the
hallmarks of Aristotelian natural kinds. The alternative is to take the claim
that “one should avoid tearing each kind apart” and “nothing alike in kind
should be torn apart” as being relative to the division under consideration.
Thus, for example, when dividing by mode of reproduction we should
avoid tearing apart those groups that share a common reproductive nature
(e.g. live-bearers, egg-layers, etc.). However, when dividing by mode of
locomotion those same animals should be kept apart as belonging to
different kinds (e.g. flyers and swimmers), since their locomotive features
are the same only by analogy.
A further worry arises from the fact that Aristotle’s so-called Great
Kinds (birds, fish, etc.) appear to play a special role in the organization of
his various biological treatises. For most of the time Aristotle’s discus-
sions proceed according to the Great Kinds.21 The role of the Great Kinds
in Aristotle’s biology is a very complicated issue, and I do not have the
space to offer anything more than a cursory response. The key question is
whether or notAristotle privileges these kinds as having inviolable bound-
aries such that any divisions that cut across those boundaries must fail to
pick out “true” kinds. The answer seems to be ‘No’. For example, while
Aristotle often treats the fish together as a single kind, he thinks that it
sometimes makes better sense to classify the cartilaginous fish with things
that are not fish for the purpose of explaining some of their features—for
example, when trying to understand certain parts of their reproductive
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anatomy that make no sense when compared with other fish (e.g. GA
716b26–33, 718a35–b2, 718b34–719a2, 732a26–b7). Although I have
only pointed to a few such examples, they are evidence of a tendency on
Aristotle’s part to split up the Great Kinds when the occasion calls for it.
It is this tendency towards splitting that is important for my reading. For
it shows that Aristotle did not treat the Great Kinds as ontologically priv-
ileged so that “don’t tear apart the Great Kinds” is not an overriding
concern of his systematics. However important the Great Kinds might be
as organizational concepts, they do not enjoy a privileged status as onto-
logical groupings.
3. Aristotle’s Realism
So far I have argued that Aristotle was a pluralist when it came to bi-
ological classification. According to this view, there are a number of
equally legitimate ways of dividing living things into kinds, and these
kinds often overlap with one another. Within this pluralistic framework,
no one set of kinds is privileged in any absolute sense; rather, which set
of kinds is selected for a given inquiry depends on the explanatory goals
of the inquirer. Despite this fact, Aristotle remained committed to realism.
For Aristotle, the kinds from which the inquirer selects are natural kinds
delineated by objective, mind-independent boundaries. Defending that
thesis will be the focus of this section.
A common objection to the idea of pluralistic realism is that the
pluralism involved is far too liberal. Without any clear criteria for
deciding which classifications are legitimate and which are not, pluralis-
tic realism allows anything to count as a genuine kind and thus loses its
connection with reality:
The metaphysical angst that many realists experience with pluralism
concerns the extent to which one can make sense of the idea that there are in-
compatible but equally ‘natural’ (i.e., real) ways in which a science can
taxonomize the entities in its domain. There is at least the suspicion that . . .
pluralism is driven more by the ‘purpose of the classification’ than by the
‘peculiarities of the organisms in question’. . . . (Wilson 1999, 203; cf.
Wilkins 2003, 623–24)
The worry here is that pluralistic realism simply collapses into a form of
conventionalism, with classification depending entirely on the interests of
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the classifier.22 Aristotle’s version of pluralistic realism avoids this
problem, since the possession of shared similarities is necessary but not
sufficient to constitute a genuine kind. For Aristotle, natural kinds are
limited to those groups whose shared similarities are underwritten by
common causes. In this way Aristotle’s approach differs from other
versions of pluralistic realism that treat all (or most) classifications as
equally legitimate.23
This reading is supported by two considerations. First, according to
PA I 4, genuine kinds (genê) are groups that (1) share “a single common
nature” and (2) contain “forms that are not too distant” (644b1–6). The
second condition has to do with a distinction between higher-level kinds
(such as birds and snakes), which are divisible into forms, and so-called
infima species (such as humans), which are not. The idea is that, while
different forms of wider kind all share a common nature, that common
nature will differ in each form by what Aristotle calls “the more and less.”
So, for example, while all birds have beaks, each form of bird (e.g.
sparrow, curlew, osprey) has a beak whose particular structure differs by
degree along its various dimensions (e.g. longer/shorter, curved/straight,
etc.).24
What exactly it means to share a “single common nature” is more
difficult. However, the rough outlines of an answer can be sketched by
considering Aristotle’s different uses of the term “nature” (see Physics II
1, Metaphysics V 4). Although “nature” is said in many ways, there are
two uses that are particularly relevant here. First, Aristotle often associ-
ates the nature of a thing with the basic form that results from its normal
development (Metaphysics V 4, 1015a11–12). In this sense having wings,
a beak, and two backwards-bending legs will be part of the common
nature of a bird (HA II 12), while being footless, blooded, and covered in
horny plates is part of the common nature of snakes (HA I 6, 490b23–4).
However, “nature” is also said to be “a certain principle and cause” of a
thing’s characteristic attributes insofar as it is the “inner source” of the
changes that produce them (Physics II 1, 192b21–3, 193a30–1, 199b31).
This is the key toAristotle’s account of natural kinds. What makes a group
of similar individuals a genuine kind is the fact that their shared attribut-
es all result from the same intrinsic causes, which Aristotle identifies with
the kind’s real essence.
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With this in mind let me turn to Aristotle’s account of egg-layers in
GA III in order to demonstrate how, despite overlapping with other
important biological kinds (including the Great Kinds), this group consti-
tutes a natural kind in the technical sense. In GA III Aristotle identifies a
network of interrelated egg-laying features that are correlated with one
another in systematic ways. At the core of this network lies a common set
of causes (including shared developmental capacities, reproductive goals,
and a particular material constitution), which together give rise to all those
features that mark off the egg-layers from other reproductive kinds. More
fine-grained differences within these common causes in turn explain the
specific “more-and-less” differences that mark off one form of egg-layer
from another (as predicted by PA I 4). For example, all egg-layers are said
to be colder and more solid in their nature than their live-bearing coun-
terparts, which explains why they all lay eggs rather than bear live young
(GA II 1, 732b29 ff.). However, where an egg-layer is located within this
particular range of the hot-cold/fluid-solid continuum causally determines
the kind of egg it lays (GA 751b8–752a10):
1. Those egg-layers whose material nature is hottest and most fluid
(e.g. snakes, lizards, and land-dwelling birds) produce ‘double-
coloured’ eggs that are completely separated into white and yolk.
2. Those whose nature is coldest and least fluid (e.g. bony fish,
cephalopods) produce ‘single-coloured’ eggs that are not at all
separated into white and yolk.
3. Those whose nature lies between these two extremes (e.g. water-
dwelling birds) produce eggs that are only partially separated into
white and yolk.
These more-and-less differences in the internal structure of the egg are
then further correlated with other reproductive differences, including
where the embryo develops inside the egg (GA 751b4–7, 754b20–7), the
shape of the egg (GA 752a11–21), and whether or not it can be fertilized
multiple times (GA 757b7–14). In this way, differences in the material
nature of an egg-layer (where it lies on the hot-cold/fluid-solid continuum)
cause differences in the internal structure of its eggs, which are in turn
causally linked to other specific egg-laying features.
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In this example, the material nature of the animal is causally basic.
But there are other causes involved in explaining other differences
between egg-layers, including formal, final, and efficient causes. For
example, all members of the kind produce embryos that develop inside an
egg (for the same reason), which generates the need for protection—a
final cause. Now in the hotter egg-layers (e.g. birds and snakes) this goal
is satisfied by producing a hard shell around the egg. But since shells are
hardened by heat, egg-layers that are too cold (e.g. bony fish) can only
produce a soft-shelled egg. And since these animals are also naturally
prolific, they must lay their eggs before they finish growing, since the
female cannot carry a large clutch of full-sized eggs inside herself. But
this makes their eggs vulnerable to predation. In order to compensate for
this, their eggs get injected with a special yeast-like substance that causes
them to expand rapidly after being laid. This causal mechanism provides
the necessary protection for the preservation of the kind, which in other
egg-layers is achieved by a hard shell.25
This example nicely illustrates how developmental, material, and
teleological causes all conspire to produce a network of other egg-laying
attributes included in the common nature of the kind. Aristotle’s emphasis
on common causes behind the shared attributes of egg-layers, and on the
correlation between those attributes and other egg-laying features, is
exactly what we should expect if he is thinking of the egg-layers as a
natural kind with the right causal structure for being an object of scientific
inquiry.
The claim that Aristotle limits natural kinds to those groups whose
shared similarities are underwritten by common causes is further
evidenced by the way he thinks a science goes about determining whether
or not its basic kinds exist. In APo. II Aristotle divides scientific inquiry
about kinds into three stages:26
Stage 1.We do not yet know if the kind K exists; all we have is a prelim-
inary grasp of a set of properties that are correlated with one
another in regular ways.
Stage 2.We know that K exists (it is a real kind), but we do not yet know
what it is to be a K (we lack knowledge of its essence).
Stage 3.We know both that K exists and what K is (we grasp its essence).
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The key to this approach is Aristotle’s insistence that the answer to “Why
is it?” which states a cause, and the answer to “What is it?” which states
an essence, are identical (APo. II 2, 90a15–19). In this way we come to
know the essence of a kind at Stage 3 by discovering the cause of those
shared similarities grasped in Stage 1. More importantly for our purposes,
we know that the kind exists (Stage 2) once we know that there is a cause
of those similarities, even if we do not yet know what that cause is (APo.
II 2, 89b37–90a1).
We can illustrate this method using a simplified example. Imagine
the kind cuttlefish (Sepioidea) was unknown to science. Stage 1 of our
inquiry is an empirical investigation aimed at building up a profile of
features by establishing correlations among the properties of certain indi-
viduals. Lennox (2004, 92) calls these “predicate profiles,” or “loci of
co-extensive predication,” which are built up by “establishing links
between universal or general differentiae.” For example, through careful
observations we come to discover a set of general correlations between
having eight arms and two tentacles, a single fin around the full length of
the body, an internal gas chamber for regulating buoyancy, chro-
matophores for rapid colour change, and a jet propulsion system. In this
way we build up, through induction, a profile of features that are regularly
found together in the same individuals. However, at this preliminary stage
of our inquiry we do not yet know whether those shared similarities are
evidence of a natural kind or whether these correlations are just a coinci-
dence. This is the task of stage 2. According to APo. II 2, the inquiry into
whether or not we have hit upon a natural kind involves asking whether
or not there is an underlying cause (or “middle term” as APo. II 2 puts it)
that explains the correlations in our preliminary (Stage 1) account.27 Once
we discover that there is a cause—although we do not yet know what that
cause is—we are justified in believing that we’ve got a natural kind. At
this point we go on to investigate (in Stage 3) what that cause is. That
causally basic feature(s) will correspond to the essence in our complete
scientific definition of this newly discovered kind.28
ForAristotle, then, what makes a group of individuals a genuine kind
is its possession of a determinate causal structure, which we come to
discover by this empirical method. It follows that, while scientific clas-
sification is driven mainly by the explanatory aims of the scientist, there
DEVIN HENRY212
are constraints on which groups she can select for her inquiry. And these
constraints derive from the world rather than from her own proclivities as
a classifier. For whether or not some group constitutes a natural kind
depends on whether or not their shared attributes actually do result from
common causes. And this depends on certain facts about the world that are
independent of our interests. In this way, although the “joints” the
biologist chooses to cut along will depend largely on her explanatory aims
as a biologist, those joints are prior to her interests. She does not decide
where the joints are.
It should be clear by now that Aristotle sees the reality of a kind as
being strongly connected with its explanatory power, which in turn
derives from the causal structure of the world. Real kinds are just those
theoretically important groups that have the sort of causal structure that
allows them to enter into scientific explanations. Since not all correlations
of properties are due to common causes (e.g. GA IV 4, 771b1–13), not all
entities that share properties in common will constitute genuine kinds. Co-
incidental correlations that are not underwritten by common causes will
not constitute real kinds and so cannot enter into any scientific explana-
tions (Metaphysics VI 2, XI 8, APo. I 2).
The type of explanations that are relevant here are what we might
call classificatory explanations.29 Here we attempt to explain why some
feature F belongs to some subject S by classifying S as a member of some
wider kind K to which F belongs “universally and primitively” (APo. I 5),
i.e., F is a basic feature of K. The corresponding causal explanation then
attempts to demonstrate why F belongs to K by identifying some aspect
of K’s nature that is causally linked to F.30 In syllogistic terms, the middle
term of a classificatory explanation identifies the wider kind to which the
subject in question belongs, while the middle term of the corresponding
causal explanation identifies the underlying cause that explains why the
feature in question belongs to that wider kind. For example, we explain
why deer lack incisors by first classifying them as a form of horn-bearing
animal: deer lack incisors because they are horn-bearers (the classificato-
ry explanation).31 Assuming this feature is a primitive attribute of that
wider kind, our inquiry then shifts to the level of horn-bearers and asks
what it is about horn-bearing animals as such that explains why they lack
of incisors. On Aristotle’s account, all horn-bearing animals lack incisors
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because of certain developmental constraints related to the production of
the horns (the causal explanation).32 This further investigation reveals the
ultimate cause for why deer lack this feature.
For Aristotle, then, classification plays an important role in science
because it helps identify the right level at which causal investigations
should take place; it helps locate the widest kind to which a given feature
belongs “universally and primitively” (APo. I 4–5, II 14).33 By consulting
the appropriate classification tree, we can see that lacking incisors is a
basic feature of horn-bearers. Thus, in order to discover why deer ulti-
mately lack incisors, we must shift our focus to that wider kind and ask
what it is about that kind that explains why its members universally lack
that property. Clearly the success of this explanatory strategy depends on
picking out real kinds with an appropriate causal structure.
Aristotelian natural kinds can also be seen to differ from one another
in terms of their explanatory power, depending on the number of features
that are explained by being a member of that kind. For example, bird has
a high degree of explanatory power; it functions as the middle term in a
wide range of classificatory explanations. Thus classifying something as a
bird helps explain a whole series of facts about it, including its possession
of a beak, two backward-bending legs with four separately articulated
toes, a crest and a long haunch bone. This makes the kind bird, we might
say, highly inductively projectible.34 The kinds lung-possessor and egg-
layer also have a relatively high degree of explanatory power to them for
the same reason. Horn-bearer, on the other hand, is less explanatory.
Being a horn-bearer helps explain why an animal lacks a complete set of
teeth (PA 663b25–644a8; APo. 98a13–19), which in turn explains why it
produces hard marrow (PA 651b30), and why it has a four-chambered
stomach (PA 674a32–4). But it explains very little else about it. Yet each
of these still constitutes a natural kind, for their members all share a set of
features in common that result from the same underlying causes (the
essence). It is in virtue of this fact that such kinds have the explanatory
power they do.35
4. Realism, Pluralism, and Systematics
To close this paper I want to draw attention to a further aspect of
Aristotle’s approach to classification that finds a close parallel with recent
trends in contemporary philosophy of biology, namely, its lack of
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taxonomic ranks. The aim is to show that Aristotle’s biology is not as
outmoded as it is often taken to be. On the contrary, it should remain of
interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines
pluralism and realism with a rank-free approach to classification, which
many philosophers of biology see as the way forward in systematics.
The contemporary theory of pluralistic realism was first introduced
in response to a version of the so-called species problem. Philosophers of
biology generally distinguish between the species category, which is a
rank in the Linnaean hierarchy, and species taxa, which are the particular
groups of organisms that biologists rank under that category (e.g. Homo
sapiens, Alca torda). In philosophical terms, the distinction is between a
general type of thing and its concrete tokens. One version of the species
problem concerns the proper definition of the species category. What is it
that makes a group of organisms a species rather than, say, a genus or a
phylum? A “species concept” is an attempt to provide an answer to this
question by identifying the essential feature(s) that makes all species taxa
instances of the species category.
The problem arises because working biologists employ a number of
competing species concepts. Some identify species in terms of inter-
breeding criteria, some on the basis of a shared ecological niche, others
based on common ancestry (just to name the three most popular
concepts).36 This is problematic for two reasons. First, in many cases
different species concepts partition organisms into different and often
cross-cutting species taxa.37 Second, not all species concepts actually
manage to capture all the groups that biologists recognize as “species.”38
There are two general responses to this problem. Monists argue that only
one species concept should be adopted by all biologists and that further
philosophical (and empirical) work will eventually reveal the right one.39
By contrast, pluralists embrace the fact that nature contains many
different and irreducible types of species and argue that these cannot be
captured by a single, universal species concept. Instead, biologists should
recognize a plurality of equally legitimate species concepts, each one of
which is useful for investigating a different set of biological relation-
ships.40
Biologists and philosophers of biology have traditionally drawn an
ontological distinction between species, on the one hand, and higher ranks
(genera, families, etc.), on the other. While they agree that the higher
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ranks do not correspond to any real divisions in nature, the species
category is taken to have ontological significance. In other words,
“species” picks out a real kind of thing. This has been embraced by both
monists and pluralists alike. However, some have urged that a commit-
ment to pluralistic realism should actually lead us to doubt the very
existence of the species category itself; it entails antirealism about
species. Ereshefsky (1998) advocates this position and offers what he
calls the “heterogeneity argument” to support it:
In sum, a realistic interpretation of species pluralism—one that accepts the
existence of different types of species taxa—implies that there is no unified
ontological category called ‘species’. It implies that the species category
does not exist. This I take to be the strong argument from species pluralism
to the non-existence of the species category. (113)
The heterogeneity argument relies on the principle that some category K
exists (it is a “unified ontological category”) if only if all the members of
K share a common property that unifies them as Ks and distinguishes them
from all non-Ks. Species pluralism holds that there are a number of
different kinds of species (interbreeding species, ecological species, phy-
logenetic species, etc.) but denies that there is any common feature that
makes them all instances of a species. Each kind of species is defined by
a different essential property. Therefore, the argument goes, the species
category fails to pick out a unified ontological category: “[T]here is no
single unitary species category, but a heterogeneous collection of base
taxa referred to by the term ‘species’” (Ereshefsky 1999, 290).41
It is important to be clear on what Ereshefsky is suggesting here. He
is not an antirealist about those entities biologists call species: “The het-
erogeneous nature of the species category gives us reason to doubt the
existence of that category, yet it does not give us reason to doubt the
reality of the taxa we call ‘species’.”42 Our recognition of a distinction
between, say, Cardinalis cardinalis and Cardinalis sinuatus is not an
arbitrary boundary imposed on a perfectly continuous world as a result of
our own subjective interests. These two groups really do constitute
distinct biological entities. Ereshefsky simply rejects the idea that the dis-
tinction we make between “species,” “genera,” and the other Linnaean
ranks corresponds to any ontological distinctions within those taxa them-
selves. In other words, there is no natural reason for ranking these as
species rather than genera or varieties; for those ranks are all artificial. As
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such, Ereshefsky recommends getting rid of the Linnaean ranks entirely.
For Ereshefsky, the way forward is to recognize that there are different
types of lineages of greater or lesser inclusiveness, without insisting on
their position in some fixed taxonomic hierarchy.
This rank-free approach to classification is precisely the approach
adopted by Aristotle. One of the main lessons from the work by Balme
(1962, 1987) and Pellegrin (1982) is that Aristotle’s twin concepts of
genos and eidos—traditionally translated as “genus” and “species”—do
not designate fixed ranks in any taxonomical hierarchy. In particular, they
do not function like “genus” and “species” in the modern Linnaean sense.
Instead they are relative concepts that can be used to identify groups at
any level of inclusiveness in a given division tree.43 This is why I have
insisted on following the more recent conventions of translating genos and
eidos as “kind” and “form (of a kind).” A genos designates any group at
any level of classification that possesses a single common nature and is
divisible into forms whose differences are a matter of degree. An eidos is
simply one of those divided forms. Thus dogs might be an eidos relative
to some wider kind (e.g. four-footed live-bearers) and a genos relative to
some more specific forms (e.g. buhunds, sheppards, spaniels, etc.).
Some have taken this as evidence that Aristotle is simply inconsistent
in how he ranks animals. But for Pellegrin and Balme this is incontro-
vertible evidence that Aristotle was not interested in taxonomic rankings
at all. The kind of plasticity afforded to the concepts of genos and eidos in
Aristotle’s biological works simply does not sit well with the idea that
they were ever meant to pick out fixed ranks in a single taxonomic
hierarchy or that they even remotely resemble the modern Linnaean ranks
of “genus” and “species.” Aristotle’s method of classification is free of
such ranking concerns.
The upshot of looking at things in this way is that the species
(category) problem simply disappears. Aristotle has no species problem
precisely because he has no concept of a “species” in our sense. His
approach to classification does not involve an attempt to pigeonhole
animals into the fixed ranks of some predetermined taxonomic hierarchy.
The way he divides animals has no use for such ranks. Thus Aristotle’s
biology is an interesting case study for Mishler’s hypothesis that the
current muddle over species concepts is the result of our doomed attempts
to shoehorn the diversity of the living world into “an outdated and
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misguided classification system, the ranked Linnaean hierarchy,” and that
the way out of this confusion is simply to remove the ranks.44 In this
sense, it is the dead hand of Linnaeus, not Aristotle, that is impeding real
progress in systematics.
Devin Henry
The University of Western Ontario
NOTES
1. The topic of natural kinds has both a metaphysical (or ontological) and a semantic
dimension. The former deals with the nature of natural kinds, while the latter has to do
with the meaning and reference of natural kind terms (Bird and Tobin 2010). In this paper
I am interested purely in metaphysical side of the debate.
2. Nominalism in biology goes back at least as far as Lamarck (e.g. 1809, Ch. 3).
3. Biologists have traditionally drawn an ontological distinction between species, on
the one hand, and higher taxa (genera, families, etc.), on the other. The latter do not cor-
respond to any real divisions in nature. I return to this in section §4.
4. There is an ongoing debate in the philosophy of biology over whether particular
species taxa (e.g. Homo sapiens) are natural kinds or individuals. See Ghiselin (1974),
Hull (1978), Kitcher (1984a), Dupré (1993, Ch. 2), Coleman and Wiley (2001), Mayden
(2002), Brogaard (2004). However, even those who claim that particular species taxa are
individuals still tend to treat the species category as a natural kind with essential proper-
ties. (For this distinction see below.)
5. See Wilkerson (1993), Daly (1996), Bird and Tobin (2010, npage).
6. Boyd’s theory of “Homeostatic Property Cluster” (HPC) kinds is an example of this
approach to essentialism. Boyd takes natural kinds to be groups of objects sharing a cluster
of stable properties in common whose co-occurrence is the result of shared underlying
homeostatic causal mechanisms, which he identifies with the kind’s real essence (Boyd
1999). This account of natural kinds has become increasingly popular among contempo-
rary philosophers, especially as an account of biological kinds. As we shall see, it also
accords well with view attributed to Aristotle in this paper (see Section §3).
7. There is of course more to realism than the following distinction between monism
and pluralism, but this is all that concerns me here.
8. Ereshefksy (1992), Dupré (1993, 1981, 1999), Kitcher (1984a, 1984b), Boyd
(1999), Wilkins (2003), Brigandt (2003).
9. Cf. Hennig (1979, 5–6); Ali Khalidi (1993, 105–6).
10. The question of whether or not Aristotle had a deep interest in biological classifi-
cation as such remains controversial. See Balme (1969, 1987); Pellegrin (1982); Gotthelf
(1988); Bayer (1988); Lennox (1990, 2001, Ch. 1, 2005); Charles (2000, Ch. 12). In what
follows I shall use “classification” to mean the systematic arrangement of organisms into
a hierarchy of kinds on the basis of shared similarities and differences. Understood in this
way, Aristotle can surely be said to “classify” animals (e.g. GA II 1, 732b15–27). Of
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course, classification is never pursued by Aristotle as an end in itself. Instead it is used to
achieve other goals, such as constructing definitions (APo. II 13, PA I 2–3) or generating
scientific problems (APo. II 14), both of which are related to the primary goal of explana-
tion (see below). Moreover, as Balme (1969) and Pellegrin (1986) have shown, Aristotle
never set out to produce an exhaustive “taxonomic” system (as Linnaeus would later
attempt to do) designed to locate animals in a nested hierarchy of fixed and exhaustive
ranks (e.g. family, genus, species). In this sense Aristotle can be said to have adopted a
rank-free approach to classification (see §4 below).
11. On traditional scientific realism, see Wilson (1996, 1999). The literature on natural
kinds tends to use “real” and “natural” interchangeably, and I shall follow that lead. By
calling Aristotle a realist about biological kinds I do not mean to ascribe to him any
position on the ontological status of universals.
12. Although the idea of “pluralistic realism” is discussed mainly in the context of a
debate about species concepts to which Aristotle was not party (see section §4), the
position itself is part of the broader philosophical discourse on natural kinds (e.g. Ali
Khalidi [1993, 106]; Slater [2005]). Indeed, as we shall see in section §4, it is possible to
be a pluralist realist without accepting our notion of species.
13. It is a separate question as to whether or not all of these count as “natural kinds” in
the sense discussed in Section §2. Undoubtedly some do not.
14. See also HA I 1, 487b14–32; GA I 1, 715a28; III 1, 749a15.
15. Aristotle thinks these are all mechanisms for cooling an animal.
16. For both of these cross-divisions see On Resp. 10.
17. In most contexts Aristotle classifies the cartilaginous fish as a form of live-bearing
animal (e.g. GA II 1, 732a32, 733b6; cf. On Respiration 10, 475b10), although he
sometimes treats them as egg-layers (e.g. GA I 9, 718b28–719a1; GA III 1, 749a18–22)
and sometimes as intermediate between the two (e.g. GA I 9, 719a11–12). This would be
an example of the second kind of case discussed below, where a given animal is suscepti-
ble to being classified in multiple (mutually exclusive) ways.
18. For more on this see below.
19. I am grateful to Charlotte Witt and Mariska Leunissen for raising this point.
20. This seems to be what Balme (1987, 85) has in mind by distinguishing true kinds
from “mere differentiae classes.” Balme does not expand on this distinction, nor do I find
any basis for marking such a distinction in Aristotle’s use of genos.
21. I am grateful to Jim Lennox for pushing me on this.
22. See Ereshefsky (2007, npage). For an extended defense of pluralistic realism
against this objection see Ereshefsky (2001, 154–93).
23. Dupre’s “promiscuous” realism, for example, treats both common sense and
scientific classifications as equally legitimate. This includes the kinds recognized by
botanists and florists, zoologists and culinary experts. Aristotle’s realism is not this
promiscuous. He is more sympathetic to Wilkerson who ties natural kinds to “causation
and explanation” (Wilkerson 1993, 13–14).
24. For a thorough account of this idea see Lennox (2001, Ch. 7).
25. For this account see GA III 4, 755a11–b1.
26. See Charles (2000, Ch. 1), Lennox (2004).
27. Compare GA IV 4, 771b1–13 for a case where we fail to find a cause.
28. Aristotle’s account can be usefully compared with Brigandt (2002) and the charac-
terization of the three stages of scientific inquiry attributed to Bhaskar in Goodwin and
Webster (1996, 10–11). Aristotle does not say how we come to know that a certain corre-
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lation of features is underwritten by a common cause, though he may be relying on
empirical regularities. The fact that B is regularly correlated with A is taken as evidence
either that one is the cause of the other or that they are both due to common cause C; for
regular correlations could not be due to chance (Physics II, 196b10–16; cf. PA III 2,
663b27–9; GA IV 4, 770b10–14; IV 8, 777a20). If this is right, then Stages 1 and 2 may
collapse into a single step. But notice that, while this regularity tells us that some cause
must exist, it does not tell us what that cause is. That requires a further stage of inquiry.
29. The following is based on Lennox (2001, Chp. 1), who calls these “A-type” expla-
nations. “Classificatory” explanation comes from Bayer (1998).
30. These are Lennox’s “B-type” explanations.
31. See APo. II 14, 98a13–19, as well as PA IV 8, 684a33 (“They [sc. lobsters] have
claws because they are in the kind that possesses claws.”).
32. For this explanation see PA III 2, 663b28–664a2.
33. Gotthelf (1988).
34. The notion of inductive projectability comes from Goodman (1973), though I am
using it in the sense used by Boyd (1999, 147) and Griffiths (1999, 215).
35. Compare Wilkerson (1993, 13–14).
36. For a recent survey of the myriad of different species concepts see de Queiroz
(2007).
37. See Mishler and Donoghue (1982, 494–95) for examples.
38. Franklin-Hall (2007) discusses problems concerning the applicability of the bio-
logical and phylogenetic species concepts to bacteria.
39. For two recent defenses see Lee (2006) and de Queiroz (2007). See Ereshefsky
(2007, §3.2) for further references.
40. For references see note 8.
41. For a response to Ereshefsky’s heterogeneity argument see Brigandt (2003).
Ereshefsky (1999, 286–90) adds a second argument that claims there are no biologically
adequate criteria for distinguishing species from higher taxa, and so again “species” fails
to meet the requirements for being a real category.
42. Ereshefsky (1998, 114).
43. For a precise statement of this view see Pellegrin (1982, 68–69) and Balme (1987,
87).
44. Mishler (1999, 311). Mishler is not suggesting we eliminate hierarchies from bio-
logical classification. The nesting of groups within groups is an essential feature of the tree
of life. It is our tendency to assign these levels fixed ranks that he thinks is the source of
our current species problem.
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